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Add PotentiallyUnguardedProtocolHandler query for Java and C++ - #32
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| public void bad1(HttpServletRequest request) throws IOException, URISyntaxException { | ||
| String url = request.getParameter("url"); | ||
| Desktop.getDesktop().browse(new URI(url)); |
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| String url = request.getParameter("url"); | ||
| URI uri = new URI(url); | ||
| if (uri.getScheme().equals("https") || uri.getScheme().equals("http")) { | ||
| Desktop.getDesktop().browse(uri); |
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| // Weak check - only checks if scheme exists, not what it is | ||
| if (uri.getScheme() != null) { | ||
| Desktop.getDesktop().browse(uri); |
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| public void bad6_rundll32(HttpServletRequest request) throws IOException { | ||
| String url = request.getParameter("url"); | ||
| // ProcessBuilder with list | ||
| ProcessBuilder pb = new ProcessBuilder("rundll32", "url.dll,FileProtocolHandler", url); |
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January 8, 2026 14:29
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Restrict scheme guards to successful HTTP and HTTPS validation. Model composed C++ commands and Java Runtime and ProcessBuilder calls. Add focused positive and negative tests plus query help.
Require recognized handlers to be the executable rather than a later argument. Add decoy-command regression tests, align Java expectations with CI, and remove duplicate documentation and newline churn.
GrosQuildu
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Nov 10, 2026
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This a multi-language query that attempts to model CVE-2022-43550 for desktop apps that employ protocol handling on untrusted URLs through a variety of mechanisms. If no sanitization/guards are introduced, then links with arbitrary protocols (eg.
smb://andsome-custom-vuln-handler://) can be supplied to trigger unintended actions against a user that clicks.Languages and frameworks supported:
rundll32 url.dll,FileProtocolHandler,xdg-openandopenfor their respective platformsQDesktopServices::openUrlDesktop.browse()