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These steps run with repository secrets (CACHIX_PRIVATE_KFB_TOKEN, CACHIX_PUBLIC_TOKEN, PYPI_TOKEN) or fetch executables consumed by later steps, but were referenced through mutable tags or an unpinned flake ref: - `workflow/nix-shell-action@v3.3.2` -> pinned to 10ebd4e8 (`v3.3.2`) - `workflow/nix-shell-action@v3` -> pinned to 608eb204 (current `v3` commit) - `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1` -> pinned to 7245906f (`release/v1`) - `github:runtimeverification/kup` -> pinned to rev 063314a7 Pinning to commit SHAs prevents a moved tag or a compromised upstream from silently changing what runs in a release job with publish credentials. Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Tagging @tothtamas28 for review, per CONTRIBUTING.md. The four pinned SHAs were re-verified against the upstream refs ( |
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Nov 5, 2026
### Why CI on this repository has to come back without any secrets, because our infrastructure was compromised through leaked secrets. CD goes away completely. This follows runtimeverification/evm-semantics#2878 and its podman follow-ups #2880 and #2881. The last run that reached the self-hosted runners (#4938, Oct 26) failed in every self-hosted job: - **K: Ubuntu Jammy (Frontend) Package**: `mkdir: cannot create directory 'debian': Permission denied`. **K: Source Build & Test**: `Unable to create parent directory for the index file: /opt/workspace/target/spotless-index`. The runners now use rootless Podman, so the container user cannot write to the bind-mounted checkout. - **K: Nix Build & Test** (Linux and MacM1): `Cachix Auth token "CACHIX_PUBLIC_TOKEN" has been revoked`. ### What changes **Removed CD and every secret** - `develop.yml` (version bump, push to `master`), `master-pr.yml` (retargets PRs to `develop` with `JENKINS_GITHUB_PAT`), `master-push.yml` (GitHub prerelease), `release.yml` (Cachix, Docker Hub, Maven, PyPI, gh-pages, dependents dispatch) and `update-deps.yml` (flake/submodule sync), plus the `check-cachix-pin.sh` helper. No release automation is left in the repository. - `K: Nix Build & Test` runs both of its self-hosted runners on their own Nix. It no longer pushes to Cachix, and it drops the `install-nix-action` and `cachix-action` steps, as the evm-semantics Nix job does. `install-nix-action` already did nothing on the runners, which have Nix installed. `cachix-action` would fail anyway, because the runners still hold the now-revoked token from earlier runs. - `with-k-docker` downloads the LLVM and Haskell backend `.deb`s from their public release URLs with `curl` instead of `gh release download` with `github.token`. **Hardening** - `permissions: contents: read` on both workflows, and `persist-credentials: false` on every checkout, including the one inside `test-package`. - Every action is pinned to the commit SHA of its latest release: checkout v7.0.1, setup-python v7.1.0, setup-uv v10.3.3, setup-java v6.1.0, upload-artifact v7.0.2, download-artifact v8.0.2, install-nix-action v31.11.3, cachix-action v17, zizmor-action v0.8.1. - No `${{ }}` expressions are left in `run:` blocks. The composite actions take their inputs through `env:`, and the pyk jobs use `${GITHUB_SHA}`. - `run-actionlint.yml` ran an unpinned install script piped from `main`. It is replaced by `lint-workflows.yml`, adapted from evm-semantics, which runs on every PR: - **actionlint**: pinned to 1.7.12, with the download's checksum verified. - **zizmor**: unlike evm-semantics, it reports findings as annotations and **fails the check**, instead of uploading SARIF to code scanning. Uploading SARIF needs `security-events: write` and never fails the check. `.github/zizmor.yml` disables one audit, `self-repository`. That audit asks for the new `uses: $/...` syntax, which actionlint 1.7.12 rejects. - The actionlint job keeps the name `Run actionlint`, which `develop`'s branch protection requires. zizmor is not a required check yet. **Self-hosted jobs on Podman** - `with-docker` copies the sources into the container with `docker cp` instead of bind-mounting them, then `chown`s them to the image user. `test-package` copies the built package back out. The test container still bind-mounts the workspace. It runs as root, which Podman maps to the runner user, so it can write there. - The container runs as the image's own `github-user` (uid 1000, the Dockerfiles' default), in a `WORKDIR` that the image now creates. The runner's user and UID are no longer passed in, and no longer have to match. - Each container is force-removed before it starts and torn down with `docker rm -f || true`. Otherwise a container left over from a canceled run of the same commit blocks the next run (evm-semantics#2881). The two package jobs now include the job id in their container names, so they cannot remove each other's containers. **No more Docker Hub pulls** CI pulled from Docker Hub without logging in: `ubuntu:<distro>` in four Dockerfiles and in the package test container, plus `runtimeverificationinc/z3`. Docker Hub rate-limits anonymous pulls per IP, and the runners share their IPs. - Ubuntu base images now come from `public.ecr.aws/docker/library/ubuntu`, AWS's mirror of the Docker official images. No login is needed. A private ECR registry would need AWS credentials, so it was ruled out. - Z3 is installed from the upstream release (`z3-<ver>-x64-glibc-2.35.zip`), with its SHA-256 pinned in `.github/workflows/Dockerfile`, instead of the `runtimeverificationinc/z3` image. The binary needs only libc, libm, libstdc++ and libgcc_s. **Smaller changes** - The base image is passed as `BASE_IMAGE` instead of being built from `BASE_OS`/`BASE_DISTRO`. `BASE_DISTRO` is still used for the local `stack:`/`maven:` image tags. Stage names are lowercase, and the repeated `ARG`s are gone. - `type:` keys are removed from composite-action inputs, since composite actions do not support them. Boolean defaults are now the strings `'true'`, which is what they were already compared against. - `actionlint.yaml` lists only the runner labels still in use: `normal` and `MacM1`. ### Tested CI on this PR passed: all 18 `Test PR` jobs, `Run actionlint` and `zizmor`. That includes the self-hosted package, source-build, Nix and pyk jobs that failed on Oct 26. The logs confirm that: - Ubuntu images were pulled from `public.ecr.aws` and nothing was pulled from Docker Hub. - The Z3 checksum verified in all three image builds. - No job used a secret. ### Notes for reviewers - **The `develop` → `master` flow stops.** With `develop.yml` and `master-pr.yml` gone, merging to `develop` no longer bumps the version or updates `master`. PRs opened against `master`, the default branch, are not retargeted, and get only `Lint Workflows`, not `Test PR`. - **Bumping `deps/z3` now needs a manual checksum update.** Update `Z3_SHA256` in `.github/workflows/Dockerfile`, and `Z3_ZIP` if the asset name changed, or the image build fails at the checksum check. - **The only token CI still uses is the automatic, per-run `GITHUB_TOKEN`**, read-only. - **PR code runs on persistent self-hosted runners.** zizmor's auditor persona flags all 8 of those jobs; that is by design. There are no secrets on them any more, but an approved PR can still leave state behind on a runner, for example in the shared `stack:`/`maven:` images or in the Nix store. Keep "require approval" for outside contributors on. - **Required checks:** every required check on `develop` keeps its name. Consider adding `zizmor` once this is merged. - This makes #4944 unnecessary, since it only pins actions in `release.yml`. ### Follow-ups - Decide what replaces release/CD: version bump, tags, GitHub releases, Docker images, Cachix, PyPI, Maven and gh-pages. `package/docker/Dockerfile.ubuntu-*`, which only `release.yml` used, still pull `runtimeverificationinc/z3` from Docker Hub. - Dependency-bump automation (`update-deps.yml`) is gone. Flake/submodule syncs for `_update-deps/*` branches are manual for now.
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Pins the three third-party references that run in secret-bearing release steps to immutable commit SHAs, plus the
kupflake input used by the installer.Changes (
.github/workflows/release.yml)workflow/nix-shell-action@v3.3.2@10ebd4e80eae8a5bc5147c0a36ebb568d1b277bd # v3.3.2workflow/nix-shell-action@v3@608eb20401e12c82b204e8e2c6a8b0eebfb5407c # v3pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1@7245906fb61fa33a13554f9d5fb856fe61758086 # release/v1github:runtimeverification/kupgithub:runtimeverification/kup/063314a75a3af900dbab864f4d5845fba2206e64Rationale
These steps handle
CACHIX_PRIVATE_KFB_TOKEN,CACHIX_PUBLIC_TOKEN, andPYPI_TOKEN(or feed executables consumed by later steps). Referencing them through mutable tags or a moving flake ref means an upstream compromise or an accidental tag move silently changes what executes in a publishing job — the pattern behind CVE-2025-30066 intj-actions/changed-files. Pinning to SHAs removes that path; the tag is kept in a trailing comment for dependabot-style readability.Broader pinning of the remaining actions (checkout, setup-java, artifact actions, cachix actions, etc.) is left out of this change to keep it minimal, but is worth doing separately.
Validation
actionlint .github/workflows/release.ymlreports no new findings on the changed lines (the only diagnostic is a pre-existing composite-action metadata warning on./.github/actions/with-k-docker, unrelated to this change).