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chore(deps): update dependency setuptools to v84.1.0 [security] - #2690
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Python test results1 tests - 154 1 ✅ - 154 0s ⏱️ -11s Results for commit 8c26591. ± Comparison against base commit 8d6824c. This pull request removes 155 and adds 1 tests. Note that renamed tests count towards both.♻️ This comment has been updated with latest results. |
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This PR contains the following updates:
80.9.0→84.1.084.0.0→84.1.083.0.0→84.1.0setuptools: MANIFEST.in exclusion bypass in sdist via Unicode normalization collision (NFC/NFD) on macOS APFS/HFS+
CVE-2026-59890 / GHSA-h35f-9h28-mq5c
More information
Details
Summary
When building a source distribution (
python -m build --sdist/setup.py sdist), setuptools'FileListappliesMANIFEST.indirectives (exclude,global-exclude,recursive-exclude,prune) by matching a compiled glob against on-disk file names byte-for-byte, with no Unicode normalization. On normalization-preserving filesystems (notably macOS APFS and HFS+), a file written in NFD and aMANIFEST.inrule written in NFC refer to the same file but are byte-distinct, so the exclusion silently fails to match. A file the maintainer intended to exclude is then packed into the.tar.gzand, if published, uploaded to the public, immutable PyPI index.Details
File names in
FileList.filescome fromos.walk(setuptools/_distutils/filelist.py,_find_all_simple), so on APFS a file written NFD is offered to the matcher in NFD, while theMANIFEST.inpattern carries the author's editor form (typically NFC). The matching path performs no canonicalization:A rule written NFC (
café=63 61 66 c3 a9) does not match an on-disk name written NFD (café=63 61 66 65 cc 81), even though the filesystem treats the two as one file.A
unicodedata.normalize('NFD', ...)helper exists insetuptools/unicode_utils.py(decompose()), but it is never called in the manifest matching path, so neither the pattern nor the walked path is normalized before matching. The only normalization in this area,EggInfoCommand._manifest_normalize, usesfilesys_decode(bytes→str decode only, no NFC/NFD) and runs when writingSOURCES.txt, after matching has already occurred.Impact
MANIFEST.inexclusions are the documented mechanism maintainers use to keep secrets, local configs, and private fixtures out of the published sdist. A non-ASCII excluded file may be published to the public, immutable PyPI index despite the rule — an irreversible disclosure with no visual cue (NFC and NFD forms render identically). Exposure is filesystem-dependent and most relevant on macOS APFS/HFS+, where many maintainers build and publish. Pure-ASCII rules are unaffected.Proof of concept
With a project containing
MANIFEST.in:and an on-disk file
secret_café.txtwritten in NFD,python -m build --sdistpacks the secret file into the resulting.tar.gz, while an ASCII control file excluded by the same directive is correctly dropped — isolating the bypass to the NFC-pattern vs. NFD-name mismatch. Reproduced on macOS APFS with setuptools 82.0.1.Remediation
Normalize both the walked path and each
MANIFEST.inpattern to a single canonical form before matching, in bothsetuptools/command/egg_info.py(FileList) and the vendoredsetuptools/_distutils/filelist.py. For an exclusion list, err toward excluding more, and document thatMANIFEST.inmatching is normalization-insensitive on macOS.Credit
Reported by Tomas Illuminati. Coordinated via CERT/CC VINCE VU#604762.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
setuptools: Windows path escape via namespace_packages.txt during legacy wheel installation Description
GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w
More information
Details
Summary
On Windows, attacker-controlled content in a wheel's
.dist-info/namespace_packages.txtcan cause setuptools' legacy wheelinstallation path to create an
__init__.pyoutside the requesteddestination_eggdir.The attacker can influence the destination path, but not the contents of
the created file.
Details
Tested setuptools commit:
6ead555c5fb29bc57fe6105b1bffc163f56fd558Relevant source:
setuptools/wheel.pySHA-256:
359b7e0d5dd8c3135653abe08a8ed5dc0352eadfd7df22cb5e2b5303b7c3cafdThe relevant call path is:
Wheel(wheel_path).install_as_egg(destination)→
_install_as_egg→
_convert_metadata→
_fix_namespace_packagesA wheel can provide attacker-controlled content in:
<distribution>.dist-info/namespace_packages.txtThe namespace value is eventually used approximately as:
A synthetic wheel was created containing:
demo_pkg-1.0.dist-info/namespace_packages.txtwhose content was the absolute path of:
sandbox\outsideThe real acquired setuptools implementation was then invoked:
The operation completed without exception.
Expected metadata was created under:
sandbox\destination\EGG-INFObut setuptools also created:
sandbox\outside\__init__.pyThe file did not exist before execution.
Its contents were:
The unrelated canary remained byte-identical.
The sandbox was deleted after recording the evidence.