agentgo is an internal runtime and must not be exposed directly to the
public internet.
Required controls:
- Internal bearer token between the gateway and
agentgooutside local development. - A dedicated internal ops listener for
/metrics; pprof is disabled unless explicitly enabled for debugging. Network isolation and optional gateway-owned authentication are deployment responsibilities. - Verified user context supplied by the gateway for AG-UI.
- The browser identity header is adopted on AG-UI only; A2A machine callers sharing the internal token cannot spoof a user identity.
- Direct mutual-TLS callers are identified by their verified certificate
subject by default. Trusting relayed identity headers on that listener
(
AGENTGO_MTLS_IDENTITY_SOURCE=header) is an explicit deployment opt-in for gateway peers and must be documented as such. - Internet-facing request rate limiting is owned by the gateway; the runtime's internal per-source limiter only resists token brute force.
- Bounded per-source throttling of invalid bearer or identity attempts.
- Deployment integrity is owned by deployment system, which assembles the images by commit sha; the runtime keeps no duplicate artifact pin.
- HTTPS-only LLM endpoints outside development and no credentials embedded in configured URLs.
- Explicit per-Agent MCP tool allowlists.
- No secrets, prompts, raw model output, or tool payloads in logs.
- Least-privilege, non-root deployment.
Do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting for this repository.