Please report security issues privately, not as a public issue or PR.
- Preferred: GitHub → the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability (private vulnerability reporting / security advisory).
- Include: affected version or commit, a description, and ideally a minimal reproduction (a crafted license, a sequence of commands, or a short test).
We aim to acknowledge a report within a few days and to agree on a disclosure timeline with you. Please give us reasonable time to fix before any public disclosure.
cryptship is pre-1.0 and moves fast. Fixes land on main and in the latest
tagged release; please verify against the latest release before reporting.
cryptship's threat model is stated plainly in the README and docs/ARCHITECTURE.md. In particular, these are known, documented limitations, not vulnerabilities:
- Host/container root extracting the running plaintext (dumping tmpfs or
/proc/<pid>/mem). Code that runs on hardware the attacker controls can always be extracted; only a confidential-compute key provider (SEV-SNP/TDX, theattestedroadmap) or remote execution prevents this. - A patched loader skipping loader-enforced policy (expiry comparison, revocation). The crypto design makes license forgery and claim tampering fail the unwrap; it does not stop someone from modifying the open-source loader they run.
attestedmode without a real verifier. It ships with test-only attestation;cryptship-server --require-attestationfails closed precisely so this isn't mistaken for protection.- Enabling
CRYPTSHIP_ONLINE_GRACEon an untrusted host (documented trade-off), and software machine fingerprints being spoofable by root.
In scope and very welcome: key/secret handling bugs, signature or AEAD verification that can be bypassed, nonce/replay/downgrade flaws, path-traversal or extraction escapes, anything that lets an unprivileged in-container attacker read the decrypted app, or any way to unwrap the content key without legitimate license material.