diff --git a/javascript/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-11-02-shell-command-arguments.md b/javascript/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-11-02-shell-command-arguments.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5bb8a5009a80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/javascript/ql/lib/change-notes/2026-11-02-shell-command-arguments.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: minorAnalysis
+---
+* Command injection modeling now recognizes argument arrays passed to `spawn` and `execFile` when the `shell` option is enabled, including string-valued shell paths and calls to `execFile` without a callback.
diff --git a/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/frameworks/NodeJSLib.qll b/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/frameworks/NodeJSLib.qll
index 10801d966542..39ffa3f6bf27 100644
--- a/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/frameworks/NodeJSLib.qll
+++ b/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/frameworks/NodeJSLib.qll
@@ -813,8 +813,8 @@ module NodeJSLib {
         methodName.matches("%Sync")
       then result = this.getLastArgument()
       else
-        // the rest (exec/execFile) has the options argument as their second last.
-        result = this.getParameter(this.getNumArgument() - 2).asSink()
+        // exec/execFile may have a callback after the options argument.
+        result = this.getParameter([this.getNumArgument() - 2, this.getNumArgument() - 1]).asSink()
     }
   }
 
diff --git a/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CommandInjectionCustomizations.qll b/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CommandInjectionCustomizations.qll
index b3516a79bf49..7db735de3889 100644
--- a/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CommandInjectionCustomizations.qll
+++ b/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/CommandInjectionCustomizations.qll
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  */
 
 import javascript
+private import UnsafeShellCommandConstructionCustomizations
 
 module CommandInjection {
   /**
@@ -55,6 +56,19 @@ module CommandInjection {
     SystemCommandExecutionSink() { this = any(SystemCommandExecution sys).getACommandArgument() }
   }
 
+  /** An argument in a `child_process` argument array that is interpreted by a shell. */
+  private class ChildProcessArgumentSink extends Sink {
+    ChildProcessArgumentSink() {
+      exists(UnsafeShellCommandConstruction::ShellTrueCommandExecutionSink sink |
+        this = sink and
+        sink.getCommandExecution() =
+          API::moduleImport(["mz/child_process", "child_process"])
+              .getMember(["execFile", "execFileSync", "spawn", "spawnSync"])
+              .getMaybePromisifiedCall()
+      )
+    }
+  }
+
   private class SinkFromModel extends Sink {
     SinkFromModel() { ModelOutput::sinkNode(this, "command-injection") }
   }
diff --git a/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnsafeShellCommandConstructionCustomizations.qll b/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnsafeShellCommandConstructionCustomizations.qll
index e65fac9530d7..03ccd20640d2 100644
--- a/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnsafeShellCommandConstructionCustomizations.qll
+++ b/javascript/ql/lib/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/UnsafeShellCommandConstructionCustomizations.qll
@@ -175,20 +175,20 @@ module UnsafeShellCommandConstruction {
   }
 
   /**
-   * Holds if the arguments array given to `sys` is joined as a string because `shell` is set to true.
+   * Holds if the arguments array given to `sys` is joined as a string because the `shell` option is enabled.
    */
   predicate executesArrayAsShell(SystemCommandExecution sys) {
-    sys.getOptionsArg()
-        .getALocalSource()
-        .getAPropertyWrite("shell")
-        .getRhs()
-        .asExpr()
-        .(BooleanLiteral)
-        .getValue() = "true"
-    or
-    exists(API::Node node |
-      node.asSink() = sys.getOptionsArg() and
-      node.getMember("shell").asSink().mayHaveBooleanValue(true)
+    exists(DataFlow::Node shell |
+      shell = sys.getOptionsArg().getALocalSource().getAPropertyWrite("shell").getRhs()
+      or
+      exists(API::Node node |
+        node.asSink() = sys.getOptionsArg() and
+        shell = node.getMember("shell").asSink()
+      )
+    |
+      shell.mayHaveBooleanValue(true)
+      or
+      exists(string path | shell.mayHaveStringValue(path) and path != "")
     )
   }
 
@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ module UnsafeShellCommandConstruction {
   }
 
   /**
-   * An argument to a command invocation where the `shell` option is set to true.
+   * An argument to a command invocation where the `shell` option is enabled.
    */
   class ShellTrueCommandExecutionSink extends Sink {
     SystemCommandExecution sys;
 
     ShellTrueCommandExecutionSink() {
-      // `shell` is set to true. That means string-concatenation happens behind the scenes.
+      // `shell` is enabled. That means string-concatenation happens behind the scenes.
       // We just assume that a `shell` option in any library means the same thing as it does in NodeJS.
       exists(DataFlow::SourceNode arr |
         arr = endsInShellExecutedArray(DataFlow::TypeBackTracker::end(), sys)
diff --git a/javascript/ql/src/change-notes/2026-11-02-shell-command-arguments.md b/javascript/ql/src/change-notes/2026-11-02-shell-command-arguments.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9b0e590d9af7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/javascript/ql/src/change-notes/2026-11-02-shell-command-arguments.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+category: minorAnalysis
+---
+* The `js/command-line-injection` query now reports remote input that reaches argument arrays when the `shell` option is enabled. The `js/shell-command-constructed-from-input` query also recognizes string-valued shell paths. Both queries now handle `execFile` calls without a callback.